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Abstract:  User authentication is the first and probably the most challenging step in 
achieving secure person-to-person communications. Most of the existing 
authentication schemes require communicating parties either share a 
secret/password or know each other's public key. In this paper we suggest a 
novel user authentication scheme that is easy to use and overcomes the 
requirements of sharing password or public keys.  Our scheme allows two 
human users to perform mutual authentication and have secure 
communications over an open channel by exchanging biometrics signals (e. g., 
voice or video signals). In addition to user authentication, our scheme 
establishes a secret session key between two users by cryptographically 
binding biometrics signals with users's Diffie-Hellman public values. Under 
the assumption that the two communicating persons are familiar with each 
other's biometrics signals, we show that the scheme is secure against various 
attacks, including the man-in-the-middle attack. The proposed scheme is 
highly suitable for applications such as Voice-over-IP.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The explosive growth of computer systems and their applications has 
considerably increased the dependence of both organizations and individuals 
on the information communicated using the Internet. However, the Internet 
is an interconnection of open public networks. Without security measures, 
communications over the Internet, such as Voice-over-IP (VOIP) and video 
conferences, can be eavesdropped without much difficulty. This in turn has 
led to a heightened effort to protect data from disclosure and to guarantee the 
integrity of data and messages communicated over open networks. User 
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authentication is the first and probably the most challenging step in 
achieving secure communications in the Internet. 
To date, the most pervasive user authentication schemes are based on 
cryptographic techniques which require that the parties either share a secret 
key (e.g., a password)1 or know each other's public key2. Although password 
based authentication protocols are widely used, there are many potential 
difficulties for a human user to share passwords with a large number of 
remote users. First of all, establishing a shared password between two users 
requires a secure secret distribution mechanism to be in place. This is very 
challenging. Second and more importantly, human users are not good at 
remember passwords of good quality, not to mention remembering multiple 
passwords shared with many remote users. Public key based authentication 
protocols require users to know each other's public key in authenticated 
manners in the form of public key certificates. This turn requires the 
existence of a public key infrastructure in the Internet, an impossible task at 
least in the near to medium terms3.  
In this paper our focus is on human user authentication in person-to-
person communications in an open environment such as the Internet. In this 
case, it is much more convenient and natural for human users to authenticate 
each other using biometrics techniques. 
Most of the existing research on biometrics based user authentication 
techniques allows a human user to authenticate himself or herself to a local 
machine. Little effort has been spent to study biometrics based methods 
which perform authentication between two remote human users. To our 
knowledge, the only work related to our effort is the Pretty Good Privacy 
Phone or PGPfone4.  PGPfone implements an authentication protocol based 
on the exchange of voice signals. However, PGPfone is vulnerable to replay 
attack. If an attacker is able to collect sound samples of all the 256 octets by, 
for example, eavesdropping on someone's phone calls, the attacker is able to 
impersonate the victim at will. 
As in PGPfone, our scheme requires that communicating users be able to 
identify each other based on the other party's biometrics signals (such as 
acoustic waves or face expression). Based on the exchange of biometrics 
signals, the proposed scheme not only authenticates remote human users but 
also enables them to have secure communications over open channels. 
Specifically, to achieve authentication and agreement of a secret session key, 
the Diffie-Hellman public key values are cryptographically committed or 
bound with biometrics signals such that the trust on the biometric 
information is extended to the Diffie-Hellman public values. The trusted 
Diffie-Hellman public values are then used to perform the Diffie-Hellman 
Key Exchange Protocol so as to defeat the man-in-the-middle attack. Since 
our scheme does not require users to share any password or know each 
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other's public key in advance, it is attractive for applications such as secure 
VOIP or secure video conferences. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses 
the primaries for clarity. Section 3 elaborates the proposed scheme and its 
variant. Section 4 discusses the availability and security. Section 5 contains 
our concluding remarks. 
2. PRILIMINARIES 
2.1 Notations 
A: shorthand notation for Alice (or her communication device) who initiates 
the communication unless stated otherwise.  Preminatary 
B: shorthand notation for Bob (or his communication device) who responses 
to Alice's communication request. 
C: shorthand notation for Clark who tries to attack the communications 
between Alice and Bob. 
CX: a challenge biometrics signal. Without loss of generality, we will use 
voice signals as the representative biometrics signals throughout the 
paper. Thus, CX is the acoustic wave or digital representation of a 
challenge statement spoken by user X (either A or B); whether it is the 
acoustic wave or the digital representation should be clear from the 
context of discussion. 
RY:  an acoustic wave or digital representation of a response statement 
spoken by user Y in reply to CX. 
RY∼CX: The response RY matches challenge CX.  For instance, the content of 
RY is the same/similar to that of CX, or RY is a correct answer to CX.  
| CX |:  the time duration of CX. 
| RY |: the time duration of RY. 
e(K, m):  encryption of message m with a symmetric key cryptosystem (e. g., 
AES) using a secret key K.  
d(K, c): decryption of a ciphertext c with a symmetric key cryptosystem 
using a secret key K. 
h(⋅): a one-way hash function (e.g., SHA-1). 
T: the required minimum time duration (e. g., 10 seconds) of any statement 
spoken by a user. 
δ: a threshold value which is much less than T, (e.g. δ=0.1T). The value of δ 
(or equivalently that of T) plays an important role in deciding the 
security strength of the protocol (refer to Eq.(1)). 
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To keep our notation compact, only residue modulo is shown in the 
following. That is, we will write gx mod p, gy mod p and gxy mod p simply as 
gx, gy  and gxy respectively, where p is a predefined large prime. 
2.2 System Architecture 
The system architect for person-to-person communications between two 
remote users, Alice and Bob, is depicted in Figure 1. We assume that Alice 
and Bob are aware that they will have an authenticated and confidential 
communication session and Alice will start the present secure protocol. This 
awareness assumption can be satisfied easily via any non-secure channel. 
The transmission channel includes but is not limited to any communication 
systems or media such as computer networks, public telephone switching 
networks and radio links. 
 
Crypto-engine 
Clock 1 Coder 
NI HDI 
Crypto-engine 
Clock 2 Coder 
NI HDI 
Device B
Attacker
Transmission 
Channel 
Device A
Bob 
Alice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The communication system architecture. 
Alice and Bob communicate with each other by interfacing with Device 
A and Device B, respectively. Device A (or Device B) accepts audio input 
from Alice (Bob) and outputs Bob's (Alice's) audio signal to Alice (Bob). 
The signals are sent and received via the Network Interface (NI). Each 
device has a clock for timing purpose, a coder performing audio 
encoding/decoding operations, and a crypto-engine executing the Diffie-
Hellman and symmetric key cryptosystem operations. We assume that the 
Diffie-Hellman parameters, g and p, are negotiated on-line or hard coded in 
the software. Without loss of generality, Alice is assumed to be the initiator 
and Bob is the responder of a communication session. 
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2.3 Assumptions 
The attacker Clark sits in the middle of the channel between Alice and 
Bob.  He is able to perform both passive (eavesdropping) and active 
(message tampering, delay, replay). He may know biometrics data of Alice 
and Bob recorded from their past conversations. Clark may have much more 
powerful resources (e.g. super-computers and large storage devices) than 
Alice and Bob. The only restriction is that Clark is not able to mimic the 
natural speech of Alice or Bob in real time. 
Alice and Bob neither share any secret data (e.g., password) nor have 
each other's public key. In order to achieve user authentication, we make the 
following assumptions: 
S1: Alice and Bob are familiar with each other's voice (biometrics 
characteristics in general) and able to recognize each other by listening 
each other's speech. This assumption is reasonable and practical since 
there are generally no confidential topics between two strangers unless 
there is the involvement of a trusted third party. 
S2: It is difficult for a human being to mimic the dynamic biometrics 
features of others in real time without being detected. 
S3 It is difficult for a machine to mimic the dynamic biometrics features of a 
human being without being detected. Text-To-Speech (TTS) technology 
targets for creation of audible speech from computer readable text. A 
high quality TTS has to select text units from large speech databases in 
an optimum way5. To make use of TTS, an attacker needs to organize a 
database of large samples. On the other hand, although speech syntheses 
technology has made significant advancement in minimizing audible 
signal discontinuities between two successive concatenated units, and 
prosodic variation, it is still not satisfactory to mimic natural speech6. For 
example, in the TTS demo7 of Microsoft Research, the speech is not 
nature although each word or short phrase is pronounced accurately, such 
that it is easy to distinguish the voice of a machine from that of a natural 
human. Similarly, the concatenation artifacts of TTS from AT&T8 can be 
detected easily. In other words, presently, synthesized speech is still 
distinguishable from human speech after many years of research and 
development. 
S4: Each participant can speak fresh sentences whose durations are sufficient 
long (e.g. at least T).  
S5: The RTT (round-trip-time) of the communication channel can be 
estimated (e.g., command ping www.yahoo.com). It is required that 
RTT « T. This requirement must be met in order for the conversations 
between the communicating parties to be audible. 
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3. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS BASED ON 
BIOMETRICS SIGNALS 
In this section, we present authentication protocols based on the 
exchange of users' biometrics signals. The protocols are designed to perform 
mutual authentication between two parties called Alice and Bob and at the 
same time allow them to share a secret session key for securing their 
subsequent communications. 
3.1 Basic Idea 
To start a secure communication session with our proposed scheme, 
Alice initiates the session by speaking a challenge statement, such as 
“This is Alice! The time is 21 minutes passed 9am. How was your mid-
term examination, Bob? ” 
Bob receives and listens to Alice's challenge, and makes sure that the 
message is indeed spoken by Alice. He then speakes a response statement, 
such as 
“Hi, Alice! Bob's here. My mid-term exam was not very good. But thank 
God, it was over! ”. 
Upon hearing Bob's response, Alice decides whether the response is 
spoken by Bob and whether it is related to her challenge. If the answer is 
positive, Alice authenticates Bob. Bob can authenticate Alice in the same 
way. 
In order to establish a secret session key during the above authentication 
process, we incorporate the Diffie-Hellman key exchange into our scheme. 
By cryptographically binding biometric signals with Diffie-Hellman public 
values, the proposed scheme is protected against the man-in-the-middle 
attack. The above conceptual description seems very simple, the scheme is 
more complicated. To demonstrate the above concept, we present two 
protocols, a sequential protocol and a parallel protocol in the following. 
3.2 A Sequential Protocol 
The authentication protocol consists of three phases: Authentication of 
Bob, Authentication of Alice. Additionally, a Key Confirmation will be 
executed so as to guarantee that both share the same session key. 
3.2.1 Authentication of Bob 
This phase, shown in Figure 2, allows Alice to authenticate Bob and 
obtain Bob's Diffie-Hellman public value gy in an authenticated manner. 
Secure Human Communications Based On Biometrics Signals 7
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Figure 2. Authentication of Bob. An underlined step is performed by Alice or Bob, while 
other steps are executed by devices. RB  ∼ CA  means that the reply RB matches the challenge 
CA. For instance, the content of RB  is the same/similar to that of CA, or RB  is a correct 
answer to CA. 
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• Alice's Challenge. Here Alice sends a challenge statement to Bob. This 
biometrics signal is cryptographically bound to Alice's Diffle-Hellman 
public value. 
(1) Alice speaks a challenge statement CA  which is input to Device A. It 
is highly preferred that CA  contains some “freshness” elements such 
as the date and time, news headlines of the day. 
(2) Device A generates a random number x, computes gx and a key 
KA=h(gx). Next, Device A encrypts CA  using KA with a symmetric 
key cryptosystem (e.g. AES) and sends the ciphertext A1=e(KA, CA ) 
to Bob over the transmission channel. 
• Bob's Commitment. In the next 2 steps, Bob sends commitment to 
Alice so that Alice discloses her challenge. Bob's commitment contains 
the encryption of his challenge statement which will be opened by Alice 
at a later stage. 
(3) Device B receives message A1 and prompts Bob to speak a challenge 
statement CB. 
(4) Device B generates a random number y, computes gy and a key 
KB=h(gy), encrypts CB using KB with a symmetric key cryptosystem 
and transmits the ciphertext B1=e(KB, CB) to Alice. 
• Bob's Response. The next 4 steps allow Bob to send his response 
statement to Alice. 
(5) Device A receives B1, sends A2 = gx to Device B and starts a clock. 
(6) Device B computes KA=h(gx), recovers CA =d(KA, A1), and computes 
a key KBA = h(gxy). 
(7) Device B plays back CA to Bob who listens to it and verifies if the 
voice belongs to Alice. If the verification fails, Bob terminates the 
session; otherwise, Bob speaks a response statement RB in reply to CA. 
Device B encrypts RB with KBA to obtain B2 =e(KBA, RB ), and sends gy 
and B2 to Device A. 
(8) Upon receipt of message B2, Device A stops the clock and obtains tA 
the elapsed time of the clock. 
• Alice's Verification. In the next 3 steps, Alice verifies the originality of 
the response and checks the elapsed time used in obtaining the response. 
(9) Device A computes KAB =h(gyx) and KB =h(gy), and then she recovers 
CB =d(KB, B1) and RB =d(KAB, B2), and computes |CA| (the duration of 
CA) and |RB| (the duration of RB ). 
(10) Note that within the time tA, Bob has to listen to CA and speaks a 
response RB. Hence,  tA ≥ (|CA | + | RB |+ ∆B), where ∆B is the delay 
due to transmitting messages A2 and B2, and processing time 
introduced by Device B in steps (6) and (7). ∆B can be estimated by 
device A. Then, Device A calculates   
δA = tA - (|CA | + | RB |+ ∆B)                (1) 
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   If δA > δ, Device A terminates the session; otherwise, Alice listens 
and verifies RB. If Alice recognizes that either RB is not in Bob's 
voice or RB is not a reply to CA, she stops the session. 
(11)Alice concludes that gy comes from Bob and authenticates Bob. 
3.2.2 Authentication of Alice 
To provide mutual authentication and key agreement, Bob will proceed 
to authenticate Alice and obtain Alice's Diffie-Hellman public value gx in an 
authenticated manner. The process is similar to that given above with the 
exception that Bob is the initiator and Alice is the responder. Note that Bob's 
challenge statement CB was sent to Alice in step (4). This is done 
intentionally so as to prevent the man-in-the-middle attack during the 
process of authenticating Alice. 
After both Alice and Bob have obtained the each other's authenticated 
Diffie-Hellman public key values, they are confident that the agreed Diffie-
Hellman key KAB is shared only among them. After mutual authentication, 
Alice and Bob can confirm their shared key easily. 
3.3 A Parallel Protocol 
A careful reader might have noticed that certain steps in Figure 2 can be 
executed in parallel so as to speed up the protocol. Figure 3 depicts the flow 
chart of the parallel protocol which has the same phases as those of the 
sequential protocol. 
• Challenges 
(1) Alice starts the session by speaking a challenge statement CA. 
(2) Device A generates a random x, computes a key KA =h(gx), encrypts 
CA as A1=e(KA, CA) and sends the ciphertext A1 to Bob. 
(3) After receiving message A1, Bob speaks a challenge statement CB. 
(4) Device B generates a random number y, computes a key KB=h(gy), 
encrypts CB as B1=e(KB, CB) and sends the ciphertext B1  to Alice. 
(5) After receiving B1, Device A sends A2=gx to Bob and starts clock 1. 
(6) Upon receipt of message A2, Device B starts its clock 2 and sends 
message B2=gy to Alice. 
• Responses 
(7) After receiving message B2, Device A computes KB=h(gy), recovers 
Bob's challenge message CB =d(KB, B1). On the other hand, Device B 
computes KA =h(gx), recovers Alice's challenge as CA =d(KA, A1). 
(8) Alice listens CB and stops the protocol if she believes that CB is not in 
Bob's voice; Bob listens to CA and terminates the protocol if he 
doubts on the originality of CA. 
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Figure 3. Parallel protocol. 
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(9) Alice speaks a response RA to the challenge CB. Device A computes 
KAB=h(gyx), encrypts RA and sends the ciphertext A3=e(KAB, RA) to 
Bob. Meanwhile, Bob speaks RB in reply to CA. Device B computes a 
key KBA=h(gxy), and sends the ciphertext B3=e(KBA, RB) to Alice. 
(10) After receiving message B3, Device A stops clock 1, recovers Bob's 
response RB=d(KAB, B3) and calculates the elapsed time tA. After 
receiving message A3, Device B stops clock 2, recovers Alice's 
response RA =d(KBA, A3), and calculates the elapsed time tB. 
• Verifications 
(11) Device A calculates δA  as 
δA= tA - (|CA | + | RB|+ ∆B) 
      where ∆B is the delay due to transmitting messages A2 and B3, and 
processing interval introduced by Device B in steps (7)-(9). Device A 
terminates the session if δA >δ. 
      Simultaneously, Device B calculates δB as  
δB= tB - (|CB| + | RA|+ ∆A), 
     where ∆A is the delay due to transmitting messages B2 and A3, and 
processing interval introduced by Device A in steps (7)-(9). Device B 
terminates the session if δB > δ. Alice listens and verifies RB. She 
stops the session if she is not convinced that RB is Bob's response to 
CA. Bob listens and verifies RA. He stops the session if he is not 
convinced that RA is Alice's response to CB. 
3.4 Variant 
An alternative approach in the protocol is that the symmetric key 
cryptosystem for messages CA and CB can be replaced by a cryptographic 
commitment function. For example, the commitment function is using a 
cryptographic one-way function h(⋅). To commit to an item m, the 
committing party computes the commitment h(k || m), where k is a secret key 
and || is the concatenation. To verify the commitment, the verifying party 
must have k and m, compute h(k || m) and compare it with the commitment. 
In other word, A1 can be replaced with h(KA || CA) , then CA will be 
transmitted along with A2. Similarly, the parallel protocol can be 
implemented with the commitment variant too.  
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4. DISCUSSION 
4.1 Availability 
In the present protocols, time restriction plays an important role for the 
availability. The scheme requires the responsor produce a related response in 
real time, otherwise, the authentication fails. To relieve this burden, the 
responsor may merely repeat the challenge in his/her own voice. Here, the 
challenge can be prepared in advance and has no impact on the availability. 
Another factor related to the availability is the variability of the network 
delay T. An inappropriate parameter T may disable to set up an authenticated 
channel. Thus, the proposed scheme is applicable such as in VOIP where the 
quality of the service itself is required to be high. 
Despite the proposed protocols may reject some genuine communication, 
no forgery is possible. In other words, although false rejection ratio FRR≠0 
due to network traffic, FAR (false acceptance ratio) is negligible. From the 
viewpoint of security, FAR is much more important than FRR. 
4.2 Impersonating Bob 
In the proposed protocols, an important condition for Alice (Bob) to 
authenticate Bob (Alice) is that Bob's (Alice's) response to her (his) 
challenge must arrive within a defined time interval. Therefore, if Clark can 
obtain the correct answer in the voice of Bob (or Alice) in the predefined 
time interval, he can impersonate Alice (Bob) successfully. To this end, 
Clark may adopt one of the following three methods to provide the response 
in the voice of the impersonated party. 
• Clark replays recorded speeches of the impersonated party. 
• Clark or his device responses to the challenge by emulating the speech of 
the impersonated party. 
• Clark lures the impersonated party to answer the challenge. 
The first two methods are not possible based on security assumptions S1-
S3. To defend against Clark's attack using the third method, it is crucial to 
check the lengths of the elapsed time of the clocks.   
Assume that an attacker would like to impersonate Bob, Figure 4 
illustrates a possible way to lure Bob to respond with RB. To this end, Clark 
performs a man-in-the-middle attack shown in Figure 4 so as to obtain CA 
and RB. In this simulated attack, Alice proceeds in the same way as that 
shown in Figure 2. For the sake of simplicity, we will only show the main 
steps which are related to the attack. 
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Figure 4. Impersonate Bob. Clark shares a channel with Alice and Bob simultaneously so that 
he can eavesdrop messages between them. 
4.2.1 Obtaining Alice's challenge CA 
In Figure 4, Alice starts a session and sends the ciphertext A1=e(KA, CA ) 
to Bob. After intercepting the ciphertext A1, Clark generates a number z, 
computes a key KC=h(gz). Based on Assumption S2, Clark can not mimic 
Bob to speak a challenge, but he may reuse Bob's recorded speech. Clark 
encrypts an old statement C'B spoken by Bob, and sends to Alice the 
ciphertext e(KC, C'B). 
Alice receives the ciphertext, replies with gx and starts a clock. Clark 
derives a key KA =h(gx) and recovers CA = d(KA, CA ). 
4.2.2 Obtaining Bob's response RB 
Because Clark can not mimic Bob's voice to produce an appropriate 
response RB, he has to lure Bob to respond to Alice's challenge CA. To this 
end, he impersonates Alice and starts a new session with Bob by sending 
Bob e(KC, CA ). Next, upon receipt of e(KC, CA ), Bob generates a random y, 
computes a key KB =h(gy), speaks a challenge statement CB, and sends the 
ciphertext e(KB, CB) to Alice. Clark intercepts the ciphertext. 
14 Yongdong Wu, Feng Bao and Robert H. Deng
 
To continue to impersonate Alice, Clark sends gz to Bob.  Bob computes 
KC =h(gz), decrypts e(KC, CA), listens to CA which was indeed spoken by 
Alice. Bob speaks a response statement RB, computes a key KBC =h(gzy), and 
transmits gy and the ciphertext e(KBC, RB) to Alice. Clark again intercepts the 
ciphertext, computes KBC = h(gyz) to decrypt e(KBC, RB ). Now he gets RB ! 
4.2.3 Calculating the elapsed time 
Clark computes KAC=h(gxz), encrypts RB with KAC, and sends the 
ciphertext e(KAC, RB) to Alice. Alice stops the clock and calculates the 
elapsed time tA, decrypts the ciphertext e(KC, C'B) and e(KAC, RB) to recover 
C'B and RB, respectively. Alice makes sure that C'B and RB are in Bob's 
voice. Since RB is indeed a response to CA from Bob, Alice will be fooled 
into believing Clark as Bob! Luckily, our protocol prevents this from 
happening by checking the clock's elapsed time tA in the following. 
4.2.4 Checking the elapsed time 
Consider the man-in-the middle attack shown in Figure 4. Within the 
time interval tA, Bob has to speak his challenge statement CB, listens to CA, 
and speaks the response RB; therefore, tA ≥ | CB| + |CA| + |RB| + ∆b,  where ∆b 
is the time used in computation and transmission. With reference to Eq.(1), 
Alice checks δA = tA - (|CA | + | RB|+ ∆B) ≥  | CB| ≥ T > δ. 
Therefore, by checking the value of tA, Alice detects the man-in-the-
middle attack and stops the session. 
 
4.3 Impersonating Alice 
The other kind of possible attack is to impersonate the initiator Alice. To 
this end, Clark has to obtain the original challenge CB and then Alice's 
respond RA to Bob's challenge CB. Figure 5 shows the second scenario of the 
man-in-the-middle attack, where Clark impersonates Alice to Bob. Therefore, 
Clark must start the communication with Bob at first. 
4.3.1 Obtaining Bob's challenge CB 
Clark generates z, computes a key KC= h(gz), and encrypts C'A - an old 
statement from Alice. Clark starts the impersonation by sending the 
ciphertext e(KC, C'A) to Bob. 
Upon receipt of Clark' message, Bob generates y, and a key KB =h(gy). He 
then speaks a reply CB, and transmits the ciphertext e(KB, CB) to Alice.  
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Clark sends gz to Bob. Bob derives KC =h(gz), decrypts e(KC, C'A) with KC  to 
recover C'A. Bob listens to C'A and believes that C'A was indeed spoken by 
Alice. He then speaks a response statement RB, derives a key KBC=h(gzy), and 
transmits  g y and the ciphertext e(KBC, RB) to Alice. Bob then starts a clock. 
Next, upon interception of e(KBC, RB) and gy, Clark derives KB=h(gy) and 
KBC =h(gzy), decrypts e(KB, CB)  to recover CB! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obtain   RA
Obtain C'A, 
speak RB, 
start clock 
 
Send gz 
BobClark Alice 
stop clock,
check tB
Obtain CB, 
speak RA 
Obtain  CB 
send gz 
e(KC,CB) 
e(KA,CA) 
gz 
e(KBC,RB) 
gy 
e(KBC,RA)
generate x 
speak CA 
generate y, 
speak CB 
generate z, 
encrypt C’A 
e(KC,C'A)
e(KB,CB) 
gz 
e(KAC,RA)
gx 
Figure 5. Impersonate Alice. 
4.3.2 Obtaining Alice's response RA 
Since Clark is not able to reply CB in Alice's voice, he starts a session 
with Alice by sending e(KC, CB) to Alice. Upon receipt of e(KC, CB), Alice 
generates x, and computes a key KA=h(gx). She speaks a challenge CA, and 
sends the ciphertext e(KA, CA) to Bob. 
Clark intercepts the ciphertext and sends gz to Alice. Alice derives a key 
KC =h(gz), decrypts e(KC, CB) to recover CB. She listens to CB and believes 
that it is in Bob's voice. 
Alice speaks a response statement RA, computes KAC =h(gxz),  sends gx 
and the ciphertext e(KAC, RA) to Bob. Clark intercepts the message from 
Alice and decrypts the ciphertext to obtain RA! 
4.3.3 Checking the elapsed time 
After obtaining RA, Clark sends the ciphertext e(KBC, RA) to Bob. Bob 
receives e(KBC, RA), stops the clock and calculates the elapsed time tB. 
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Without checking the elapsed time tB, Bob would have been fooled into 
believing that he is talking to Alice since RA is Alice's reply to CB. However, 
within interval tB, Alice has to speak CA, listen to CB and speak RA, thus,  
δB = tB -(| CB| + | RA | + ∆A ) ≥  | CA| ≥ T > δ.  
Therefore, by checking the elapsed time tB, Bob detects the man-in-the-
middle attack and hence stops the session. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper describes a scheme for mutual authentication and key 
establishment between two remote human users. Unlike most of the existing 
authenticated key establishment protocols where remote authentication is 
based on sharing a secret/password or knowing remote party's public key, 
our scheme is based on exchanging of signals representing remote user's 
biometrics information. Although clock timing plays an important role in our 
protocols, only relative time is used so that synchronization between two 
parties is not required. Our technique is especially useful for securing 
telephony or videoconference communications over open networks. We 
illustrated our scheme with protocols using audio signals to represent users' 
biometrics information. It should be noted that security of the protocols can 
be improved with additional biometrics information such as facial image and 
mouth movement. Such additional information adds few burdens to the 
human users, but greatly increases the difficulty of attacking the protocols.  
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